314 research outputs found
Extended Inclusive Fitness Theory bridges Economics and Biology through a common understanding of Social Synergy
Inclusive Fitness Theory (IFT) was proposed half a century ago by W.D.
Hamilton to explain the emergence and maintenance of cooperation between
individuals that allows the existence of society. Contemporary evolutionary
ecology identified several factors that increase inclusive fitness, in addition
to kin-selection, such as assortation or homophily, and social synergies
triggered by cooperation. Here we propose an Extend Inclusive Fitness Theory
(EIFT) that includes in the fitness calculation all direct and indirect
benefits an agent obtains by its own actions, and through interactions with kin
and with genetically unrelated individuals. This formulation focuses on the
sustainable cost/benefit threshold ratio of cooperation and on the probability
of agents sharing mutually compatible memes or genes. This broader description
of the nature of social dynamics allows to compare the evolution of cooperation
among kin and non-kin, intra- and inter-specific cooperation, co-evolution, the
emergence of symbioses, of social synergies, and the emergence of division of
labor. EIFT promotes interdisciplinary cross fertilization of ideas by allowing
to describe the role for division of labor in the emergence of social
synergies, providing an integrated framework for the study of both, biological
evolution of social behavior and economic market dynamics.Comment: Bioeconomics, Synergy, Complexit
A Fundamental Scale of Descriptions for Analyzing Information Content of Communication Systems
The complexity of a system description is a function of the entropy of its
symbolic description. Prior to computing the entropy of the system description,
an observation scale has to be assumed. In natural language texts, typical
scales are binary, characters, and words. However, considering languages as
structures built around certain preconceived set of symbols, like words or
characters, is only a presumption. This study depicts the notion of the
Description Fundamental Scale as a set of symbols which serves to analyze the
essence a language structure. The concept of Fundamental Scale is tested using
English and MIDI music texts by means of an algorithm developed to search for a
set of symbols, which minimizes the system observed entropy, and therefore best
expresses the fundamental scale of the language employed. Test results show
that it is possible to find the Fundamental Scale of some languages. The
concept of Fundamental Scale, and the method for its determination, emerges as
an interesting tool to facilitate the study of languages and complex systems.Comment: 29 pages, 2 Tables, 5 Figure
Co-Operative Punishment Cements Social Cohesion
Most current attempts to explain the evolution - through individual selection - of pro-social behavior (i.e. behavior that favors the group) that allows for cohesive societies among non related individuals, focus on altruistic punishment as its evolutionary driving force. The main theoretical problem facing this line of research is that in the exercise of altruistic punishment the benefits of punishment are enjoyed collectively while its costs are borne individually. We propose that social cohesion might be achieved by a form of punishment, widely practiced among humans and animals forming bands and engaging in mob beatings, which we call co-operative punishment. This kind of punishment is contingent upon - not independent from - the concurrent participation of other actors. Its costs can be divided among group members in the same way as its benefits are, and it will be favoured by evolution as long as the benefits exceed the costs. We show with computer simulations that co-operative punishment is an evolutionary stable strategy that performs better in evolutionary terms than non-cooperative punishment, and demonstrate the evolvability and sustainability of pro-social behavior in an environment where not necessarily all individuals participate in co-operative punishment. Co-operative punishment together with pro-social behavior produces a self reinforcing system that allows the emergence of a 'Darwinian Leviathan' that strengthens social institutions.Altruism, Cooperation, Social, Prosocial, Cohesion, Evolution, Punishment, Retribution
Culture Outsmarts Nature in the Evolution of Cooperation
A one dimensional cellular automata model describes the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation when grouping by cooperators provides protection against predation. It is used to compare the dynamics of evolution of cooperation in three settings. G: only vertical transmission of information is allowed, as an analogy of genetic evolution with heredity; H: only horizontal information transfer is simulated, through diffusion of the majority\'s opinion, as an analogy of opinion dynamics or social learning; and C: analogy of cultural evolution, where information is transmitted both horizontally (H) and vertically (V) so that learned behavior can be transmitted to offspring. The results show that the prevalence of cooperative behavior depends on the costs and benefits of cooperation so that: a- cooperation becomes the dominant behavior, even in the presence of free-riders (i.e., non-cooperative obtaining benefits from the cooperation of others), under all scenarios, if the benefits of cooperation compensate for its cost; b- G is more susceptible to selection pressure than H achieving a closer adaptation to the fitness landscape; c- evolution of cooperative behavior in H is less sensitive to the cost of cooperation than in G; d- C achieves higher levels of cooperation than the other alternatives at low costs, whereas H does it at high costs. The results suggest that a synergy between H and V is elicited that makes the evolution of cooperation much more likely under cultural evolution than under the hereditary kind where only V is present.Social Simulation, Interactions, Group Size, Selfish Heard, Cultural Evolution, Biological Evolution
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